# List of start points

==save/qstart.sav
The outbreak of war, September 1939

When war was declared, the RAF's bomber force was small, and composed largely of obsolete types.  It was tasked with
 attacking enemy shipping, but forbidden to bomb land targets as this might endanger civilians.
Another of its duties was the dropping of propaganda leaflets over Germany, in an attempt to encourage the Germans to
 turn against their leaders.
Navigating by dead-reckoning and the stars, the bombers would struggle even to find their targets.  Luckily, the Reich,
 whose air forces were committed to attack, was ill-prepared to repel night raids.

==save/civ.sav
The start of the Strategic Offensive, May 1940

On the 14th May, 1940, the Luftwaffe heavily bombed Rotterdam.  It was reported around the world as a "terror bombing".
 The following day, the RAF was at last authorised to attack industrial establishments within Germany; so began the
 five-year-long Strategic Bombing Offensive.  Oil facilities were a popular target due to their propensity to burn
 spectacularly; but all too often, the fires the bombers created were in open country many miles from the targets.
The mining of strategic sea lanes and the dropping of propaganda leaflets continued, though the latter was viewed by
 aircrew as a tedious 'bind' and a pointless risk of their lives.
With the desperate needs of the fighter force, only limited resources could be spared for the development of new
 bombers; at the same time, the Germans were deploying a highly effective radar system, Würzburg, to scan the skies over
 the Third Reich and locate the bombers.
Fortunately, poor strategy and technique by the Germans in their deployment of radar meant that nightfighters were not,
 yet, a serious threat; the main cause of losses was from Flak.

==save/abd.sav
The Area Bombing Directive, February 1942

Faced with the reality that its bombers could not hit individual factories, the RAF looked for a new use for its
 strategic bombers.  It found one in the 'dehousing' theory of Professor Lindemann, Lord Cherwell, who proposed that
 heavily bombing an entire city could destroy the morale and will to resist of its inhabitants.  The whole city would be
 smashed and the workers, many of whom would be bombed out of their houses, would arrive at work only to find that the
 factories had been hit as well.  It was hoped that this would paralyse the city and effectively cease production in all
 its industries.  Repeated on enough German cities, this could cripple the Nazi war machine.
But with the increasing effectiveness of German nightfighters and only a small number of the new four-engined 'heavies'
 in service, would Bomber Command be able to deliver?

==save/ruhr.sav
Battle of the Ruhr, March 1943

As Bomber Command came into its power, its leaders found an ideal target: the heavy industrial complex of the Ruhr
 valley, and especially the town of Essen.  Together with nearby cities such as Cologne, Düsseldorf, Duisburg and
 Bochum, the steel mills, oil plants and armament factories of the region were to receive the full weight of bombs that
 the RAF could deliver.
However, the Germans, knowing the value of their industrial heartland, had protected the Ruhr region with thousands of
 Flak guns.  The resulting battle would prove a true test of Bomber Command's might.

#==save/berlin.sav
#Battle of Berlin, November 1943
#
#Encouraged by the devastation of the Ruhr and the destruction of Hamburg, Bomber Command turned its attention to 'the
# Big City' - Berlin, the capital.  A sprawling metropolis, it wasn't hard to find and hit, but important targets weren't
# concentrated; the modern buildings were not as flammable as ill-fated Hamburg had been; and Berlin was deep in Eastern
# Germany, almost twice as far from the bombers' bases as was the Ruhr.
#The bombers would have to carry more fuel and thus fewer bombs, they would be more vulnerable to German nightfighters,
# and Berlin lay beyond the range of ground-based radionavigation systems like Oboe.  Was Berlin just too tough a target?
#
